AI and Slovakia: Will FDI diminish ?

Artificial intelligence (AI) fueling 4.0 Industrial Revolution has put on center stage several questions in the context of a converging economy, such as the one of Slovakia. Will the introduction of AI help the main pillars of the Slovak economy such as FDI-owned manufacturing industries ? Which policy challenges will it bring to the fore ?

Economic convergence leads to rising wages

Convergence of a national economy to the level of Western economies in the European Union means that via labor productivity increases the overall economic growth surpasses that in the EU – over time the gap between the level of economic performance of Western and Eastern countries decreases. With an overall national wage growth at a certain level – as some key sectors over-perform – some sectors may run out of potential for productivity gains and its labor productivity tempo might be lagging behind the national average of wage growth.

Which are the two scenarios for the development of such sector i.e. sector where labor productivity growth no longer goes hand in hand with wage growth at the national level ?

A) Scenario without much introduction of new machinery

Assume labor compensation/output remains at significant levels (say 40-50%) as is oftentimes the case in manufacturing sectors. Given that wages are rising at the national level, company X must somehow upgrade the production so that supposedly positive gap between return and cost of capital is not eaten up. This can happen either through new processes or introduction of new higher-value products (such as higher value-added car models in car industry). This continuous upgrade of production must go on until the labor productivity growth reaches its limits. At that point, the factory could continue producing but the economic rate of return (ROIC- cost of capital) would start shrinking. Or it can re-allocate production to some other place such as further East. Given that labor constitutes a significant share of output, much lower labor costs in the East in excess of the re-allocation costs may drive decision to move eastward, to a cheaper location.

B) Scenario with a heavy introduction of new machines, incl AI

With the introduction of labor-saving new machinery such as AI machines, labor compensation to output ratio (labor share) would likely plummet (let’s say from 40-50% levels to, say, 10% level) – hence cost advantage of labor diminishes since now labor accounts of much smaller share in cost structure. Whether it is Slovakia or low wage Kazakhstan, there is not much difference in labor cost to produce. However, the costs of re-allocation to the East remain still significant.

On the basis of this simplified analysis, it is clearly in the interest of Slovakia that foreign-owned car plants introduce labor-saving machines since this reduces the incentives that headquarters re-allocate production to cheaper locations, such as in the East.
This is because after AI machines are employed, a labor share on a company level declines dramatically to the point where it nearly does not matter where the factory is located geographically. If now labor accounts for let’s say 10% of produced economic value this means that whether the factory is in France or Slovakia or Kazakhstan matters much less than before from the viewpoint of labor costs. However, given that it is costly to set up a new factory in the East, it is not very likely the car factory would migrate eastward (Kazakhstan). If anything, given the advantages of being in home country it may rather go back to home country (France) despite higher hourly labor costs.

In order to summarize, on the basis of this simplified analysis it seems that sectors where introduction of AI factories is feasible and makes economic sense, their installation would reduce incentives to migrate eastward. On the other hand, a significant gap between domestic wage level and a wage level in the East may create very sharp incentives to re-allocate whenever the labor costs constitute major share of costs, as is the case in sectors without AI machines introduction.

The good news and the bad news for Slovakia

At a nutshell, for Slovakia AI introduction will be good and bad news at the same time. It will be good news because AI will lead to reduction of importance of labor costs in certain sectors as the competitive factor and will blunt incentives for the existing manufacturing plants to leave Slovakia and move eastward where wages are lower than in Slovakia. In such case, geographical location is much less important and given the existence of re-allocation costs incentives will likely be to remain intact geographically.

However, it also means that for a country such as Slovakia future FDI will be much harder to acquire since the advantage of low labor cost as a competitive factor will be significantly reduced in AI intensive sectors. Things like quality of the business environment, tax regime or reduction of country risk ( which will reduce the cost of capital) through better institutional environment will matter relatively more. More generally, it means we might thus move into the world where soft factors such business/institutional environment factors matter more for investment decisions than the labor cost.
Sector-level wise, at the national policy level in Slovakia one should focus efforts to attract FDI on areas where AI will not make much difference and a ratio of wage bill to output remains significant (such as tourism, hospitality, some other services). This is because attempts to lure FDI – in absence of strong advantages in the institutional arena – where wages do not constitute a high share of output anymore would likely prove futile.

AI likely to suppress incentives for FDI

More generally, the application of AI to manufacturing will likely lead to reduction of downhill FDIs globally in the future and probably mean a less integrated world going forward. Pending AI machines installation projects may even already explain some of the recent fall in cross-border FDI in 2018. The world with much less FDI puts a premium on domestic economic policies to nurture home companies and fuel domestic economic growth.

The quality of human capital will continue to matter and its relatively low cost may be a driver for certain inward investments (such as shared services) in sectors where there is still a high share of labor compensation on output. Investment in country’s human capital should thus remain important – after-all, AI machines dominated factories will require presence of super-sophisticated managers/engineers. Given that future incoming FDI will likely slow down – at least in those sectors where robots can replace humans – much higher effort should be focused on building a domestic enterprise sector via start-ups support and different schemes of nurturing domestic entrepreneurship.

A divergence back again ?

If the simplified analysis above is correct, implications of it seem quite dim for developing countries and challenges they are facing. Given that their business and institutional environments are relatively weak and labor cost is a primary competitive advantage factor, FDI where robots can replace humans will likely be not lured to such areas to the same extent as before. Some FDI factories might even migrate uphill to areas with better business, tax and institutional environment since importance of labor cost will be so drastically reduced. In developing countries, bottlenecks on markets with super-sophisticated managers/engineers to run such AI-intensive factories may contribute to that as well. Weak business and institutional environment, underdeveloped human capital all leading to now much lower intake of FDI and low sophistication of domestic economies to begin with, mean that such developing countries might face challenges to develop modern export sectors and thus to follow development model based on export-led growth focusing on sophisticated sectors. It could also lead to the race to the bottom regarding environmental standards as developing countries try to compete on non-labor cost factors. Whether AI heavily applied to manufacturing sector also means a higher probability of middle-income trap incidence for countries such as Slovakia is worth pondering too.

Vladimir Zlacky,
Bratislava, 26 JUne 2019

It is brands, Economist !

It is brands, Economist !

Typically, many economists have not always fully appreciated business disciplines of softer nature – marketing as a field quickly comes to one’s mind. Yet, it is enormous how significant is the value astute marketing people can create for the national economy. They not only help salespeople of companies penetrate markets home and far abroad but through strategic brand-building enormously enhance the economic value of production.

It is not rare that a branded product – a product which carries a recognized and reputed brand – can sell for a multiple of price of a generic product. This is typically a result of concerted brand-building efforts by and within a given organization. Consistent and attractive visuals and designs of products, thought-out media advertising, marketing events of many kinds, aligned organizational behavior – these all can come under a rubric of brand-building. Yes, brand-building also entails a cost but typically astute marketing people can create the brand where a brand price premium can exceed the incurred cost substantially.

When the national economy has many high-quality brands this might also have macroeconomic implications. It can mean that countries with the most astute marketing people can see their GDP enhanced by these strategic marketing efforts more than others. This is something not completely obvious when one thinks about the role and the effect of marketing in the economy (one would think perhaps, in a first cut, of mostly zero-sum game when analyzing marketing effects within a sector). Furthermore, branded products command a much higher degree of customer loyalty – this has implications for competitiveness of the national economies. Just think what a 20% appreciation of domestic currency does with the competitiveness/profit margins of commodities exporting countries vs. highly branded products exporting countries. The latter economy is clearly much more robust to currency value shocks.

When looking at this issue via the glasses of somebody born and living in a Central-Eastern European (CEE) country one has to appreciate the road traveled since the inception of transformation of these economies to a market model also in case of local marketing activities. The marketing area was extremely neglected during the socialism regime as very little advertising and brand-building took place. During the last 30 years enormous progress was achieved as demonstrated by springing up of many attractive brands in these economies, although most of them are only of local significance. Obviously, not all progress was domestically driven but rather the effect of inflow of FDI, which brought some marketing practices, and of other foreign influences cannot be underestimated.

Yet, while the marketing expertise in the CEE economies has advanced, further improvement could be achieved by bringing business education closer to business people in these countries. Offshoots of Western business schools could perhaps find this high growth terrain of converging economies of CEE a very lucrative base for spreading their influence. If establishing their branches in CEE, they could further nurture Western management practices and culture in these countries. Besides so important marketing field as noted above, other creative areas such as general/strategic management, leadership and people management or entrepreneurship could thus be supported in CEE too. By means of not only degree programs but of various executive and evening/weekend programs such schools could help local business people grow in expertise. Spearheading entrepreneurial and start-ups culture in countries where FDIs have been a typical engine of development to date should also be commended if such school(s) appeared in the region.

Given that human capital – also that entailing best business practices – seems one of the bottlenecks of further economic development in CEE, the government could also contribute by introducing tax incentives for the whole sector of lifelong learning, including business school education.

Vladimir Zlacky
May 4, 2019

Euro and real exchange rates

This year it has been twenty years since the introduction of the euro on the financial markets following the fixing the cross-exchange rates of the currencies of founding eurozone countries. For some, this step as of 1 January 1999 meant a reason for celebration as the formation of eurozone was the milestone towards the accomplishment of the so-called European project. To others, it presents the opportunity to ponder the economic viability and sustainability of the euro-zone area going forward. This is because the sheer construction of this currency area implies many risks and the sustainability of this monetary construct is not beyond doubt.

The Mundell’s theory of optimal currency area was supposed to justify the euro-zone project. However, whether the eurozone as now constructed, which includes the peripheral South as well as some countries of the converging East , is such area is not without a question. This blog argues that with such degree of heterogeneity, as it is now present in the Eurozone, and – by definition of the monetary area – a lack of adjustment via cross nominal exchange rates in the euro area, we would be lucky if that by now significant dis-equilibria would not appear in the countries of this currency area.

First, to be fair if little speculatively, a brief comment on (im)possibility of installing equilibria in many-countries-world, the case of the flexible exchange rate regime notwithstanding. In a hypothetical world with two countries and two currencies at least in principle it should be possible to achieve equilibria in these two countries – flexible nominal exchange rate should arrive at the level such that both countries have achieved internal and external equilibria. This, in theory, could be achieved very fast or even instantaneously by the movement of the nominal exchange rate between two currencies. However, what happens if there are three, four, five or many more countries as it is the case in the real world ? Does a set of cross-exchange rates equilibrate these economies in the world in which we live ? It seems to the author that, given this complexity, even in the world of flexible exchange rates it might be difficult to achieve equilibria in all countries. This is because there are too many variables – and relations among them – at play. Furthermore, some are fixed or slow-moving in the short-term. However, adjustment towards the equilibrium in an individual country can be fast in the world of flexible exchange rates.

In order to see the issue of dis/equilibria more clearly, let’s remind ourselves of the concept of real effective exchange rate (REER). It is constructed as the nominal effective exchange rate i.e. trade-weighted exchange rates against currencies of trading partners adjusted for a trade-weighted differential of price inflation. Empirically, the inflation index to be used can be CPI (consumer price index), PPI (producer price index) or ULC (unit labor costs). Such REER can then be a useful indicator of competitiveness or existing imbalances, especially if compared with some equilibrium yardstick.

Of course, cross nominal exchange rates in eurozone countries were eliminated as their currencies ceased to exist when the countries formed the currency block. However, does this mean that we should cease to track the respective real effective exchange rates of the eurozone countries ? Of course not – they continue to be a useful concept. There still is a substantial room for variation of REERs of eurozone countries because a) there exists an inflation differential between individual eurozone countries and trading partners whether eurozone members or other countries; b) eurozone countries trade with non-eurozone countries ( portfolio of trading partners differs in each country) and the nominal exchange rates of euro vis-a-vis those countries can adjust; c) trade weights change over time too.

Hence – given that the eurozone is far from homogeneous and fully synchronized entity (think about the South or East) and because of the effect of non-eurozone countries on REERs – real effective exchange rates of individual eurozone countries could follow various paths and possibly diverge widely from where they were at the onset of the euro (and their equilibrium trajectories). Therefore, after twenty years of its inception and a lack of cross nominal exchange rates among eurozone countries, we might be in the world where REERs are far from equilibrium in many a eurozone country. These REERs trajectories and their divergence from equilibrium paths may represent the fault lines of this monetary area. The only question now is how far from equilibrium we are in the individual countries. Of course, the most significant challenge is that under the euro regime i.e. with no possibility of nominal exchange rate adjustment on an individual basis – redress towards the equilibrium might be protracted and in some cases very painful.

Here, some additional economic research could help further shed light on issues. By using a suitable equilibrium framework – be that some form of FEER ( fundamental equilibrium exchange rate) or BEER (behavioral equilibrium exchange rate) which are known in the literature – one could quantitatively gauge the extent of the current imbalances in individual eurozone member economies. Given that fast redress via own currency movement is foreclosed – since individual currencies of eurozone countries no longer exist – certain countries could be stuck far from equilibrium. The additional research on REERs in the eurozone could further ignite thinking how to eliminate or at least reduce imbalances under constraints present within the current euro-zone construct and engineer the paths closer to the equilibria in the most efficient and socially least costly ways.

Vladimir Zlacky

Beyond FDI model

Nearly three decades ago, at the onset of transition, ex-socialist countries’ enterprise sector was lagging severely behind that in the developed West – machines, and technology more broadly, were largely obsolete, labor productivity low and managerial techniques inadequate for a modern economy. Restructuring of enterprises i.e. installation of new technologies, improvement in quality of products, introduction of new processes, upgrade of the labor and management and exploration of new markets was crucial for the success of transition.

While early macroeconomic policies were designed to address macroeconomic disequilibria, they in combination with policies for micro-level adjustments were to conduce to enterprise restructuring. In many transition countries, foreign direct investment (FDI) was the key solution towards the task of enterprise restructuring. This was because – at the inception of transition and ensuing first years of reforms – there was a severe lack of capital, inadequate domestic technology and underdeveloped managerial talent.

This demand for FDI capital led to a huge inflow of foreign direct investment to the transition countries when literally hundreds of billions euro worth capital led to acquisition of a substantial share of domestic productive capacity in these countries. Relatedly, some numbers will demonstrate that – in a small economy of Estonia by 2017 cumulative inward FDI reached nearly 90% of its GDP (net position being 61% of GDP). Other countries became significant hosts of FDI as well – inward investment in Czechia were 72% of GDP while that in Hungary was 65% of GDP by 2017.

Source: OECD

It seems fair to say that up to now the FDI has been the main driver of growth in most post-socialist countries. However, these countries have matured by now – a pool of managerial talent has grown both by quantity and quality, countries have been integrated into international sales chains, capital for sound projects is available from private equity groups or banking sectors. Domestic R&D and science have moved closer to the world’s frontier in some countries and the quality of managers and other experts is such that the technological know how can be imported easily. In other words, investment landscape in at least most advanced countries of the region has changed and is conducive to formation and growth of world competitive but domestically owned companies.

Hence, it seems that at the end of 2010’s the big “growth” question is which model of growth to promote ? To further a model based on FDI or attempt to nurture domestic enterprises ? As often-times is the case, the middle road will likely deliver the best results. FDI still brings most modern managerial know-how and corporate culture, tested processes, high quality products and connection to existing markets – all valuable attributes of a modern enterprise. It would be a mistake to discourage their inflow.

However, should generous FDI incentives be kept in many countries or these resources be rather targeted to creation of domestic startups and existing companies ? To be sure, domestic companies have certain advantages too. First, large domestic investment groups/enterprises are probably more keen to invest in public goods than foreign-owned enterprises. Things like very local infrastructure, education, culture or sports – investments that have spillovers – are much more likely to be supported by local big entrepreneurs than by branches of large multinational companies. Second, at times, domestic policymakers may want – through a moral suasion or otherwise – coordinate with a private sector and in such cases domestic entrepreneurs will more likely be brought on board to cooperate.

Last but not least, as Prof. Dani Rodrik1 reminds us, FDI ownership shifts the bargaining power from labor to capital leading to lower wages on a company level (and may lead to lower labor/output ratios in the whole economy). In extreme case, detachment of labor from the companies in combination with perceived unfair wage treatment may lead to backlash against foreign ownership as such. A legitimacy of the current highly integrated economic system might be called into question as well. From this point of view, a more balanced economic structure – one in which both foreign and domestic enterprises co-thrive – seems to lead to more sustainable economic model.

Hence, given limited resources available, it might make sense to earmark some share of resources yet devoted for FDI incentives for the support domestic start-ups instead. Given that typical start-ups do not require much funding, a relatively large number of small starting entrepreneurs could be thus supported. One way to accomplish this is through a independently run fund with multi-source funding – perhaps partly private charity sponsored – from which the entrepreneurs could petition a support or via which various other schemes of support could be administered. Only a small share of funds hitherto available to huge FDI projects and redirected to small business could make a big difference to many individuals. The support of start-ups or small entrepreneurship would have an added advantage of pulling employees into entrepreneurship thus converting them into “capital-owners” with positive implications for social mobility, distribution of income and nurturing of entrepreneurial culture in these countries. Furthermore, this all could work as a potential recipe against the backlash against the current economic system which in its nascent form seems ubiquitous at many corners of the world.

Vladimir Zlacky

1. Dani Rodrik, “Populism and the economics of Globalization”, Journal of International Business Policy, 2018

Is the advanced East as rich as the Southern Europe?

As a regular visitor and keen admirer of Andalucia of southern Spain or Crete of Greece I not only get enchanted by the marvels of the two vacation heavens. Being an economist from an ex-socialist country, I also like to keep my eyes open to gauge the contrasts and differences between my home country and the European South, cultural as well as those related to the respective economies.

A perusal of various statistics of the real economic performance of the Central Eastern European countries and the European South – here defined as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece – suggests a substantial level of convergence of the former to the level of the latter. While in the early 1990’s – at the onset of transition – the CEE countries lagged substantially behind all Western European countries, now the picture is very different. In terms of the economic output adjusted for prices (PPP) the most advanced countries of CEE such as Czechia with 89% of GDP of the whole of EU and Slovenia (85%) have overtaken Portugal (77%) and Greece (67%) while are nearing the level of Spain (92%) and Italy (96%). Does it mean that the most advanced countries of CEE are about 10-20 % points richer than Greece/Portugal and about 5-10% points poorer than Spain/Italy ? Does it mean that – with a bit of simplification – we can claim that the level of riches in the frontier CEE countries have reached those of the European South ?


GDP per capita in PPP, EU=100













Source: Eurostat 2017

While it is useful to count on the official statistics to paint the picture of overall riches in these countries, any visitor to the southern Europe vs CEE will make his own assessment on the basis of local incomes, prices and visual surroundings and probably conclude that something does not quite dovetail. Why ? This article will put in a sharp contrast comparison on the basis of measures of real economic activity vs comparisons which includes the effects of price levels as well as accumulated wealth.

The fact that CEE countries are normal, in parlance of Prof. Shleifer1, in a sense that they are coping with issues of typical market-based economies is well established. From this view angle the TRANSITION is over – but is the CONVERGENCE process really nearing its completion (when numerically compared to the European South) ? From the point of view of wealth abundance, are really advanced CEE countries approaching the riches of the southern EU countries ?

As with many statistics in economics, here also it is instructive to note a difference between flow and stock indicators. The Gross Domestic Product – a value of all goods and services produced on the territory of a given country within a year – is clearly a flow variable. When a comparison is made on the basis of GDP adjusted for prices we compare the level of economic activity in real terms. Since what gets produced, gets distributed, this also says something about a standard of living in countries. In this sense, Czechia/Slovenia are not far from the best performing southern countries (Italy/Spain) while their real GDP is higher than that of Portugal and Greece.

While the real GDP is a construct of economists who in cross-country comparisons adjust for differing prices, the actual GDP that is produced in economic life is nominal.On an individual level, prices one sees in shops are nominal, wage an individual receives is nominal. On a company level, sales are nominal and so are the investments, for instance. On a country level, current account balances, debt levels or investment flows – all of these indicators are also of nominal variety. In other words, the world in which individual participates, the one he can touch is nominal.

This fact that the actual economic life is “nominal” is oftentimes neglected by economists who overly work with their analytical constructs which adjust for prices, they talk “real” variables. However, for instance, when one thinks about the national economic power, the nominal GDP is much more useful concept than the real GDP. Investment flows that help some countries grow or outflow of which can devastate others are kept on records in nominal figures. Price signals that transmit crucial information throughout the economy, which are important for decisions of consumers, firms and other entities are also nominal. In other words, the real world seems to be nominal.

Hence, in cross-country comparison, there is a clear need to look at GDP figures also before adjustment is made for price differences i.e. GDP in nominal figures. Because of much less competitive production structures and ensuing foreign imbalances, many of the CEE countries had to put up with severely undervalued currencies at the inception of transition. Hence their price levels at the beginning of transition were much lower than those prevailing in the West (for instance the price level of the Czech economy in 1995 was 38% of the EU level). Even now, nearly three decades after the transition started, prices in CEE countries are much lower than in the Western or Southern part of the EU. According to Eurostat, in 2017 the Czech price level was only 67% of the average price level in EU while that in Slovenia was 82%. Prices in Portugal (82%) / Greece (89%) and those in Spain (91%) and Italy (99%) are above the level in CEE countries. On the basis of these statistics, it seems that convergence in real output has outpaced the convergence in prices in CEE. The result is that “the nominal world “ – which is the the world a visitor from the East sees when visiting South – is “scaled up” nominally in the South compared to the CEE region.

In order to hammer this analytical point home further, make the following thought experiment. Both a hypothetical country East and country South have the same real GDP per capita (and, say, same labor/output ratios and similar conditions on labor market – this should imply same real wages). However, the country South price level is 30% level higher (nominal wage of worker from South is 30% higher). Would workers of both countries “feel” the same rich ? The argument could be made that visitor from East to the South is worse off than it is in the opposite case, for obvious reasons. Everything being scaled up by 1.3 factor, the South is more expensive for the visitor from the East than is his home country. Obvious implications follow.

As mentioned above, price levels everywhere in Southern Europe are higher than those at most advanced CEE countries. This contributes to one’s skepticism about the claim that “the East has nearly reached the level of wealth abundance of the South”. A comparison of GDP in nominal figures for the six countries, as in the table below, further brings this point home. For instance, Italy and Czechia are much further apart in this comparison; the latter country is behind Portugal.

The table below shows 2017 GDP per capita in nominal terms:

Country GDP per capita 2017, USD




















Source: IMF

Even more important than the “nominal or price effect” is the issue of differences in the accumulated wealth. In flow/stock parlance, accumulated wealth is clearly a stock indicator. According to Credit Suisse, in 2018 the average wealth per adult in Italy was 217,787 USD, Spain 191,177 USD, Portugal 109,362 USD and in Greece 108,127 USD. This is substantially more that 79,097 USD in Slovenia and 61,489 in Czechia. It seems that the advanced countries of CEE are nowhere near the wealth levels compared to the South, be that poorer countries like Portugal or Greece or richer ones like Italy and Spain. This is the second explanation for a much skepsa that the top CEE countries are near the Southern countries in the level of their riches.

Source: Credit Suisse: Global Wealth Report, 2018

A more thorough inspection and analysis of economic statistics suggests that the level of convergence of the most advanced CEE countries in prices has not progressed as far as the convergence in real economic activity. Furthermore, differences in wealth likely due to the fact that southern countries have had market-based economic systems for longer that the CEE countries leads to a further explanation for lower perceived wealth abundance of the CEE vis-a-vis the European South.

This answers the question posed at the beginning of this narrative whether the advanced CEE countries reached the level of riches of the South to the negative. Nevertheless, the expected continued convergence in the future is likely to further reduce over time the differences between the CEE and the South, both in income and wealth.

Vladimir Zlacky

1.) Prof. Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Treisman. 2014: Normal Countries: The East 25 Years After Communism, Foreign Affairs

Pro-growth agendas to gain traction in CEE ?

It is nearly three decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall which led to an upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) unleashing fundamental changes in the formerly socialist countries of the region. The task of revamping the socio-economic systems of these countries was daunting and multifaceted – the economic as well as political systems of the Eastern bloc countries had to be utterly revamped. The road to the envisaged market-based economic model supported by democratic politics was bumpy and far from costless. The CEE countries of the region not only had to “traverse the valley of tears”, borrowing here from Prof. Przeworski1, when initial reforms meant to address the issues of macroeconomic disequilibria, relative price adjustments and fundamental ownership changes led to heavy economic losses but also to undertake protracted and demanding institution building thereafter. At least for the advanced countries of Central Europe the transition road is basically over since – according to the economic criteria – they exhibit all features of normal mid-income market-based economies, as highlighted in the research of Profs. Shleifer and Treisman .2

The convergence of the formerly socialist countries in terms of economic output to the level of developed West proceeded at an uneven pace as the countries’ initial conditions and transformation strategies adopted by policymakers differed. This resulted in often vastly differing output and other economic outcomes’ trajectories. The Eurostat data show that the most advanced countries of Central Europe such as Czechia, which reached the level of 89% of GDP per capita in normalized prices (PPS) of EU(28) in 2017 or Slovenia (85%) are nearly closing the gap with economically advanced nations of Europe, at least in terms of the economic output. A study by UniCredit Slovakia economists 3shows that sector-level adjustment was also rapid in the advanced countries of Central Europe and convergence nearly completed in the sector level structure. When comparison is made within sectors, however, more needs to be done so that these countries come yet closer in production to the productivity frontier of the advanced West. Other countries, such as Estonia (79%) , Lithuania (78%) Slovakia (76%) and Poland (70%) are also making a rapid progress in convergence.

Interestingly, the most advanced CEE countries are already reaching levels near – Italy (96%) and Spain (92%) – and are above southern European old members of the EU such as Portugal (77%) and Greece (67%). The further rapid convergence is predicated on the ability of the CEE countries to generate investment, be that of domestic source or FDI, further enhance the quality of their work force and to reduce a technological gap with the advanced economic nations.

Although at a slower pace than during the decade in the run-up to the financial crisis in 2008-9, the CEE countries have been growing briskly this decade. According to Focus Economics, the growth in the EU(11) countries – eleven post-socialist countries of EU – should be 4.1% this year. However, the cyclical upturn is reverting to a close in the CEE region as the expected Eurozone slow-down, labor bottlenecks in some countries, potential fallout from Brexit as well as monetary tightening will bring easing of the economic growth in 2019. The overall economic growth of the EU(11) region, according to the forecast of Focus Economics, will be 3.4% with Slovakia claiming the leading position with expected 3.7% annual growth ahead of Poland with 3.6% growth. With growth in the region on the taper trajectory, further need for adopted pro-growth agendas seems imminent. According to the study by McKinsey Global Institute4 an explicit pro-growth agenda adopted by governments seems to be one of the crucial supporting factors of the long-term economic success , at least when one retrospects the growth record of countries over the last fifty years globally.

Which areas of policy reforms or adjustments would most conduce to a strong growth in medium to long term in the CEE region ? Three thematic areas – business environment, institutional framework and human capital – seem particularly worth addressing:

1.) Business Environment. Perhaps because of a lack of domestic capital, technological know-how and developed managerial talent, the economic growth of most countries of CEE was largely driven by foreign direct investment (FDI). While very supportive of economic growth, in the longer term, an FDI-based growth model alone does not seem to be an optimal one. More balanced economic structure is needed should the countries rapidly climb the value ladder in the longer term; company headquarters rarely relegate the highest value-adding economic activities to recipient countries. The notion that there is a need for a balanced economic structure beyond the “FDI model” is further implied by the study of McKinsey Global Institute which highlights the importance of domestic corporate champions for the sustained rapid economic development.

Measures such as reducing administrative burden for entrepreneurs, eradicating obstructive regulations, minimizing red tape/ corruption and putting certain public services for entrepreneurs online would go a long way towards supporting the growth of small business. Public-private partnerships in the area of start-ups and R&D could further lead to nurturing small business/SMEs and be a push for development of technologically advanced firms. This would all conduce to a higher likelihood of bringing to life national corporate champions that could spearhead regional or country-wide development one day.

2.) Institutional Framework. Importance of institutions for economic prosperity of countries is well established in economic literature, most owing to Prof. Douglas North. Property rights and contracts need to be well defined, fairly and predictably enforced for production and commerce to flourish. This area gains further salliance in the countries of former socialist block as the institutional frameworks underpinning their socio-economic systems needed to be fundamentally revamped.

Their constitutions had to be re-written, commercial code re-introduced/redesigned and other important laws adopted or changed. Judiciaries, public administration and other executive bodies were in need of a reform. No doubt, the fast-evolving global economy and its trends mean that laws in the CEE countries need to be constantly adjusted or newly written too. However, going forward, it is mostly the reforms of the public sector organizations which pose policy challenges as they will require concerted and detailed effort, oftentimes bear political costs and do not present policymaker with much low-hanging fruit. Nevertheless, in terms of public welfare enhancement – since these reforms would conduce to both efficiency and economic growth – the area of reforming institutions, bodies enforcing them and other public sector organizations is of enormous significance.

3.) Human Capital. A continued upgrade of human capital of the CEE countries would likely significantly contribute to speeding up convergence and reaching higher level of prosperity. While benefiting from the legacy of relatively good schooling under socialist regimes, the current educational systems of the CEE countries are no longer keeping abreast with the modern standards and mostly lagging behind those in the developed West. For the countries to speed up convergence, they will likely find in their benefit to improve the formal educational sector and incentivize the development of the sector of lifelong learning.

Particularly, university and other higher education sectors merit further attention – currently it seems that the foreign owned business sector is substituting for local universities and higher learning in shaping relevant skills of employees in many CEE countries. Should countries have aspirations to further climb the value ladder in production, improvements of the R&D and higher learning sectors seem vital. Particular countries’ strengths, available resources and traditions should decide whether to focus only on applied research or to attempt for breakthroughs in advanced basic research; that overly generous flow of resources to the latter could bring inefficiencies cannot be over-emphasized here.

Given the fast technological progress and an ensuing changing demand for extra skills, lifelong learning is becoming quintessential for continuous upgrade of labor force, more reasonable income distribution and future productivity gains. An access to quality business education not only via full-time degree programs but also, or especially, through executive and evening/weekend business programs would lead to nurturing of specialized expertise / managerial talent so needed to enhance the economic value of the output and to support local entrepreneurship in the CEE countries. Targeted tax incentives could help increase resource flow to the whole sector of lifelong learning in the CEE countries.

The year 2019 will likely see an economic growth slowdown in the region of Central and Eastern Europe (3.4%). Further forecast easing of the growth in CEE is on the horizon in 2020 (2.9%). Recent policy research results, which point at importance of explicit growth agenda adopted by governments for a development success juxtaposed on the expected slowdown of economic growth across the globe will likely bring a theme of pro-growth agendas to the fore everywhere, including CEE.

Assuming clairvoyance on the part of policymakers in CEE, should these countries aspire to keep their convergence tempo from the past, explicit pro-growth agendas – addressing the key themes of business environment, institutional framework and human capital – might gain traction in the near future.

Vladimir Zlacky

1.) Adam Przeworski. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, 1991

2.) Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Treisman. 2014. “Normal Countries: The East 25 Years After Communism.” Foreign Affairs.

3.) Zlacky, Vladimir, and Lubos Korsnak, 2011. “ A brief note on sector productivity in CEE: 1995-2009”, unpublished working paper, UniCredit Bratislava, 2011, available on

4.) McKinsey Global Institute :Outperformers: High-growth emerging economies and the companies that propel them “ September 2018 ; “ In pursuit of Prosperity”, November 2018

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